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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN SOTER and TOM SOTER, 
Plaintiffs arnd Appellamts, 
-vs.-
ZEKE SNYDER and STREVELL-
p ATERSON FINANCE COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Civil No. 
6180 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to cancel and rescind a leasH and 
conditional sales agreement, both documents having been 
entered into on the 14th day of November, 1952, between 
the plaintiffs as lessees and purchasers and the defend-
ant Zeke Snyder as lessor and seller. The defendant 
Strevell-Paterson Finance Company is alleged to be the 
pledgee of the instruments for a loan procured from it 
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by defendant Snyder. The complaint also prays for 
judgment against Snyder in the sum of $12,400.00 paid 
in connection with the conditional sales agreement (Tr. 
1-11). 
Plaintiffs allege, as the inducement for the execution 
of the lease and conditional sales agreement, that Snyder 
fraudulently represented the business theretofore con-
ducted on the leased premises, the Delmar Lounge at 315 
South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, to be a profit-
able one; that the net profit realized for each of the two 
prior years was approximately $7800.00 and that the 
gross sales for each of the two years prior to the execu-
tion of the agreements exceeded the sum of $50,000.00 
(Tr. 1). The plaintiffs allege that in truth and in fact, 
as Snyder well knew, the representations were false in 
that the business had not been a profitable one and had 
not realized the profit claimed to have been made nor had 
the business grossed over $50,000.00 in sales for the two 
years preceding the agreement (Tr. 2). 
The defendant Snyder denied the allegations of 
fraud, pleaded estoppel and a waiver of any alleged fraud 
and, by counterclaim, a breach of the conditional sales 
agreement, prayed judgment for the unpaid balance with 
interest and costs of suit and that the payment of the 
judgment "be secured by the defendant Zeke Snyder's 
title retaining lien upon all of the personal property cov-
ered in said contract." (Tr.12-14). 
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In an amendment to the answer both defendants 
pleaded further estoppels against the plaintiffs, one to 
the effect that on February 24, 1953 the plaintiffs ap-
proved the conditional sales agreement and, in writing, 
stated that they had no charge-off or set-off against 
the amount to which they were then allegedly indebted 
to the defendant Snyder, and the other that the plaintiffs 
knew Snyder was negotiating for a loan from the defend-
ant corporation and that the statement of the balance 
due on the agreement was a condition precedent to the 
making of such loan (Tr. 16-18). 
The case was tried to a jury, .which returned a spe-
cial verdict on two propositions, to-wit: 
"Zeke Snyder did not state in substance to 
John and Tom Soter: 'I grossed over $50,000.00 
in 1951."' (Tr. 245). 
"Zeke Snyder did not state in substance to 
John and Tom Soter: 'In 1951 I made a net profit 
of between seven thousand and eight thousand 
dollars.' " ( Tr. 246). 
The trial court entered findings and conclusions of 
law on the jury's special verdict (Tr. 249-251), declared 
the conditional sales agreement in default and ordered 
judgment of no cause of action against the plaintiffs and 
a judgment in favor of Snyder in the sum of $10,600.00, 
with interest from the 2nd day of October, 1953 at the 
rate of 6% per annum "and that upon the payment in 
full of said judgment together with interest, defendant 
Zeke Snyder shall deliver to the plaintiffs John Soter and 
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Tom Soter full title to all of the pe-rsonal property set 
forth in that certain Conditional Sales Agreement dated 
November 14, 1952." 
The Conditional Sales Agreement, Exhibit B at-
tached to the complaint (Tr. 3-6), provides in paragraph 
6 thereof that if the purchasers shall fail and neglect 
to make any of the payments specified or within 30 days 
thereafter, then the seller may at his option declare the 
entire sum then remaining unpaid to be due and payable 
and upon failure of the purchasers to pay said sum seller 
may retake possession of the property. The purchasers 
by said agreement, the plaintiffs herein, waive any ac-
tion for trespass or damages for the retaking of the prop-
erty and specifically agree that in that event the seller 
may retain all installments previously paid by purchasers 
as and for compensation for the use of said property 
by the purchasers. It is to be noted that the agre·ement 
does not contemplate a personal judgment against the 
purchasers nor does it provide any remedy other than 
repossession. 
The clerk entered a judgment (Tr. 252) pursuant to 
the findings and conclusions of the trial court, which 
findings and conclusions omit any reference to the af-
firmative defenses of waiver, estoppel and the like urged 
by each of the defendants and which matters are, there-
fore, not before this court on this appeal. 
The judgment as entered is for no cause of action 
as to the plaintiffs and for the sum of $10,600.00 in favor 
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of the defendant Snyder on the Conditional Sales Agree-
ment, with the language with respect to the delivery of 
title upon payment of the judgment as set forth above. 
The trial court in its instructions to the jury, Instruc-
tion No.11 (Tr. 241), instructed: 
"You are instructed that the gross sales for 
the Delmar Lounge in the year 1951 were $40,-
866.99, and that the net profits for that year were 
not in excess of $2,321.28." 
The defendant Snyder on direct examination testi-
fied in effect that he told the Soters that he made a good 
living out of the Delmar because he had paid twenty-
eight hundred dollars a year on his home and that with 
the life insurance that he carried on himself and his wife 
he presumed it would cost him in the neighborhood of five 
thousand dollars (Tr. 179). Snyder also testified on 
direct examination that he made a statement with respect 
to the amount of money that he was drawing out of the 
business. 
"Q. What did you say~ 
A. Seventy-eight hundred dollars-twenty-eight 
hundred dollars payments on my home and 
possibly five thousand living expenses." ( Tr. 
179-180). 
On cross examination Snyder testified that at the Canton 
Cafe, where the deal was made (Tr. 172-173), he stated 
that he had been making a good living out of the business. 
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"Q. You told them further that you were paying 
twenty-eight hundred dollars on your home-
A. That is right. 
Q. -per year, and it cost you approximately five 
thousand dollars to live yourself, your wife',s 
insurance and your own insurance and your 
necessities~ 
A. That is correct. 
Q. So five thousand added onto twenty-eight 
hundred makes seventy-eight hundred dol-
lars~ 
A. That is correct. 
Q. That's what you told them that you were 
taking out of the business~ 
A. That is right." (Tr. 201-202). 
The Soters testified that Snyder stated that he was 
not only clearing between seven and eight hundred dol-
lars a year, but that he was grossing fifty thousand to 
sixty thousand a year and had grossed over fifty thou-
sand dollars for the year 1951 (Tr. 27). While Snyder 
denied that he stated that his gross business was from 
fifty to sixty thousand dollars a year and specifically in 
the year 1951 (Tr. 179), he, nevertheless, admitted say-
ing that his gross business averaged fifty thousand dol-
lars a year ~ot including 1952, and failed to mention 
that in 1951 his business had dropped down to approxi-
mately forty thousand dollars (Tr. 206). 
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After the return of the special verdict a motion fo~ 
new trial was timely made ( Tr. 254), one of the grounds 
being that of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict and judgment and that the judgment and verdict 
is against law and the evidence, which motion was there-
after denied ( Tr. 255). 
We have not attempted to set forth above all of the 
evidence in the case but only that part of the record suffi-
cient, we believe, to warrant a reversal of the judgment 
appealed from and to point to the error of the trial court 
in denying the motion for a new trial, which we urge 
upon the following: 
STATEMENT OF' POINTS 
POINT 1. 
THE FINDING OF THE JURY THAT SNYDER DID NOT 
STATE IN SUBSTANCE THAT HE GROSSED OVER FIFTY 
THOUSAND DOLLARS IN 1951 IS CONTRARY TO THE 
EVIDENCE AND ALL OF THE REASONABLE IMPLICA-
TIONS THEREOF. 
POINT 2. 
THE FINDING OF THE JURY THAT SNYDER DID NOT 
STATE IN SUBSTANCE THAT IN 1951 HE MADE A NET 
PROFIT OF BETWEEN SEVEN AND EIGHT THOUSAND 
DOLLARS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE BUT 
IS IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE TESTIMONY OF 
SNYDER HIMSELF, BOTH ON DIRECT AND CROSS EX-
AMINATION. 
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POINT 3. 
THE JUDGMENT OF $10,600.00 IN FAVOR OF THE DE-
FENDANT SNYDER IS A MONEY JUDGMENT WHICH IS 
CONTRARY TO LAW AND TO THE ·CONTRACT OF THE 
PARTIES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
WHERE THERE IS AN ENTIRE F AlLURE OF EVI-
DENCE TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT, THE VERDICT AND 
JUDGMENT WILL BE SET ASIDE. 
This court has repeatedly held that in a law case, if 
there is any substantial competent evidence to support 
the findings, they will not be disturbed. See Sproul v. 
Parks, 116 Utah 368, 210 P. 2d 436, and Wyatt v. Baugh-
man, ______ Utah ______ , 239 P. 2d 193. But where there· is 
no substantial evidence in the case to support the finding 
then the judgment will be set aside. Carter v. Standard 
Ace. Ins. Co., 65 Utah 465, 238 P. 259. 
We proceed upon the premise that the verdict must 
be plainly wrong and if it be manifestly against the 
weight of the evidence it is the duty of the court to set it 
aside. People v. Swazey, 6 Utah 93, 21 P. 400, and United 
States v. Brown, 6 Utah 115, 21 P. 461. In the latter case 
this Court stated: 
"The only question presented is, does the evi-
dence warrant the verdict~ In the case of U.S.. 
v. Harris, 19 Pac. Rep. 197, where the same ques-
tion was presented, this court stated the principles 
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which shall govern as follows : 'The jury are 
the judge·s of the facts, and, in order to justify 
this court in reversing the order refusing a new 
trial, it must appear that there was an entire ab-
sence of evidence, or that the e·vidence so clearly 
preponderates in favor of the prisoner as to sug-
gest the possibility that the verdict was the result 
of misapprehension or partiality. It is not enough 
that the court might have arrived at a different 
result.' We are satisfied with the rule thus stated, 
and it only remains to test the case at bar by it." 
The general rule is stated in 3 Am. Jur., Appeal and 
Error, Section 890, pages 450-451, as follows: 
"But while a reviewing court hesitates to set 
aside a verdict on the ground of insufficiency of 
the evidence, especially when the trial judge has 
refused to do so, still if it is flagrantly contrary 
to the evidence and the court is convinced that an 
injustice has been done, it will and should set it 
aside, not only in criminal, but also in civil, cases." 
A special verdict or special findings of the jury are also 
to be set aside if they have no support in the evidence or 
are contrary thereto. To this effect is 53 Am. Jur., Trial, 
Section 1089, pages 755-756: 
"In the absence of evidence to support a ma-
terial finding, it may be set aside or stricken from 
the record, and in the discretion of the court judg-
ment may be entered in accordance with the un-
disputed evidence in the case, or the verdict may 
be set aside entirely and a new trial granted." 
In the instant case it was a conceded fact, and the 
court so instructed the jury by its Instruction No. 11, that 
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gross sales for the Delmar Lounge in the year 1951 were 
$40,866.99 and the net profits for that year not in excess 
of $2,321.28. As to the gross business done for the year 
1951 the issue was pin-pointed by the interrogatory to the 
jury: 
"The jury is directed to indicate with an X 
in each question below whether they find propo-
sition (A) or proposition (B) to be true. Before 
you can find proposition numbered (A) in any 
question to be true, it must be found by a clear 
and convincing preponderance of the evidence. 
(A) Zeke Snyder stated in substance to John 
and Tom Soter : 'I grossed over $50,000.00 in 
1951.' 
(B) Zeke Snyder did not state in substance to 
John and Tom Soter : 'I grossed over $50,000.00 
in 1951.' 
________________________ x ________________________ ." ( Tr. 245) 
Aside from the form of the so-called proposition 
and the stripping from the same of the element of mis-
representation upon which the complaint is based and 
which is the ultimate fact, as contrasted with the words 
"did not state," the question submitted is still open to 
what Snyder might have necessarily intended by his 
statements because the question that the jury is to answer 
is whether Snyder stated "in substance" that he grossed 
over $50,000.00 in 1951. Literally Snyder testified : 
"Q. Did you ever make the statement, Mr. Snyder, 
to either Tom or John Soter or his father at 
any time that you did fifty to sixty thousand 
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dollars' worth of business a year and speci-
fically in the year 1951 ~ 
A. No. 
Q. Were you ever asked a statement how much 
business did you do in the year 1951 ~ 
A. No." (Tr. 179). 
By the use of the terms "state in substance" in the 
so-called interrogatory we take the position that the court 
did not intend that the jury construe the evidence in the 
literal sense. We point to Snyder's testimony on cross 
examination: 
"Q. Yes. Now, Mr. Snyder, you stated that in this 
conversation you had at the cafe· in response 
to how much business you were making, that 
you had been averaging around fifty thou-
sand a year. Is that right~ 
A. F·or the number of years that I have had it, 
not including '52, the average, the approxi-
. mate average, in fact, I said approximately 
fifty thousand dollars a year. 
Q. You didn't mention that in 1951 the average 
had dropped from fifty -seven thousand down 
to forty thousand, did you~ 
A. That wasn't an average." (Tr. 206). 
Snyder's testimony conveys the definite idea, by way of a 
representation, that there was no substantial difference 
between the pin-pointed year of 1951 and the other years 
as far as gross earnings were concerned, particularly in 
light of the fact that he did not disclose that the gross 
earnings in 1951 had dropped to $40,866.99. 
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While special verdicts have their proper place, never-
theless they can be abused by over simplification which 
works an injustice. It is submitted that the answer of the 
jury as above set forth does not find support in the evi-
dence and is in fact contrary thereto. The complaint 
alleged the misrepresentation to be that the yearly gross 
sales for two years prior to the transaction exceeded the 
sum of $50,000.00. 
The next proposition that the jury answered was as 
follows: 
"(A) Zeke Snyder stated in substance· to John 
and Tom Soter: 'In 1951 I made a net profit of 
between seven and eight thousand dollars.' 
(B) Zeke Snyder did not state in substance to 
John and Tom Soter : 'In 1951 I made a net profit 
of between seven thousand and eight thousand 
dollars.' 
________________________ x ________________________ ." ( Tr. 246). 
The answer that the jury made to the foregoing is con-
trary to the evidence. As pointed out above Snyder on 
cross examination testified that at the Canton Cafe, 
where the deal was made, he told the Soters that he had 
been drawing out of the business seventy-eight hundred 
dollars a year and that he so calculated the amount be-
cause he paid twenty-eight hundred dollars on his home 
and expended approximately five thousand dollars in 
living together with the payment of premiums on his and 
his wife's insurance (Tr. 201-202). His testimony was 
the same on direct examination (Tr.179). 
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It is demonstrated, we believe, that the only two 
propositions answered by the jury do not find support 
in the evidence but are directly contrary thereto. 
POINT 2. 
THE JUDGMENT ON THE COUNTERCLAIM OF THE 
DEFENDANT SNYDER IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND TO 
THE .CONTRACT OF THE PARTIES .. 
Paragraph 6 of the Conditional Sales Agreement, 
Exhibit A attached to the complaint (Tr. 3-6), provides 
as follows: 
"If the Purchaser shall fail or neglect to make 
any of the payments specified, or within thirty 
(30) days thereafter, then the Seller may, at his 
option, declare the entire sum then remaining un-
paid then to be due and payable and upon failure 
of the Purcllasers to pay said sum, Seller may 
retake possession of the said property, free from 
all claims whatsoever, and to that end and without 
notice to the Purchasers, the Seller is hereby au-
thorized to enter said premises and without legal 
process to take and remove said property. The 
purchasers hereby waive any action for trespas~s 
or damages therefor and Seller in that event may 
retain all installments previously paid by Pur-
chasers as and for compensation for the use of 
said property by the Purchasers." 
By the foregoing the parties have agreed that repos-
session of the property, title to which is reserved by 
Snyder, is the only remedy in the event of a breach 
of the contract by the Soters, the amounts theretofore 
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paid by them being forfeited as fixed and liquidated dam-
ages for the use of the property. It is a familiar rule that 
where the parties have bargained for a specific remedy 
in the event of a breach of contract the court cannot re-
write the contract nor grant relief not so bargained for. 
In Corbitn on Contracts, Vol. 3, Section 541, it is said: 
"In judicial opinions it is often stated that 
'the courts do not make a contract for the parties' 
and that the parties must be content to perform 
and to receive performance in accordance with 
their own agreement. Such statement's are usu-
ally made in a case in which the court refuses to 
make an implication that one party is asserting 
and the other is denying. It is true that a court 
never makes a contract for litigating parties; but 
court and jury may find that the parties made a 
contract when in fact they did not; and the court 
may decree the existence and enforcement of a 
quasi contract not created by mutual assent. Also, 
when the parties have themselves so far satisfied 
legal requirements that the court is willing to hold 
that a contract has been made, it will compel per-
formance in accordance with what it believes to be 
required by good faith and fair dealing." 
The judgment in the instant case in favor of the de-
fendant Snyder and against the Soters for $10,600.00 is a 
judgment for the balance of the purchase price and not 
contemplated by the contract of the parties. 
In the case of American-Lafrance Fire Engine Co. 
v. Bagge, 276 P. 1066 (Cal.), it was held: 
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"* * * the seller explicitly limited its right, 
in the event of a failure to receive payment in 
a certain amount during 120 days after the sale, 
to repossess itself of the property mentioned in 
the contract, and having set forth these facts in 
its complaint in the first cause of action therein, 
it proceeded to do exactly what the trial court 
stated-'pleaded itself out of court.' It had but 
one remedy under the conditional contract of sale, 
and its pleadings show that the plaintiff has mis-
taken its remedy so far as the first cause of action 
is concerned." 
As in the American-Lafrance case, supra, the con-
ditional sale contract in the instant case does not give 
the seller an election as to whether he would repossess 
himself of the property or declare the entire purchase 
price due and institute suit for the unpaid portion there-
of. Snyder's only remedy is to retake possession of the 
property, retaining all installments previously paid by 
the Soters as and for compensation for the use of the 
property by them. This remedy is expressly contracted 
for and the judgment of the trial court ignores the con-
tract in both its letter and the spirt of the same· by grant-
ing a personal judgment for the unpaid balance in favor 
of Snyder and against the Soters. 
CONCLUSION 
Our rules of procedure are calculated, of course, to 
do substantial justice between the parties but the instant 
case demonstrates, we believe, that an over simplification 
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can have the opposite effect. A review of the entire form 
of special verdict will disclose that the jurors, to hold 
for the plaintiffs, would have been required to answer 
eight questions and to hold for the defendants they were 
required to answer but two questions, and that in answer-
ing the eight questions for the plaintiffs there would have 
had to have been a constant reference back to questions 
that might have already be·en answered. The form of 
special verdict used in this case is confusing and, al-
though not calculated to do so, had the effect of suggest-
ing a course of least resistance for the seven of the eight 
jurors returning the verdict to agree on the two questions 
and then go about their own personal business. Such 
precise pin-pointing is, we respectfully submit, contrary 
to the realities of jury trials. But once a special verdict 
has been returned with the answers reduced to a focal 
point as was done in this case in the two questions that 
the jury did answer then, when it is shown that the ver-
dict is not supported by but is contrary to the evidence, 
a new trial in the interests of justice should be promptly 
granted. Furthermore, the judgment on Snyder's coun-
terclaim should not be permitted to stand as the same is 
contrary to the explicit language of the agreement and 
the remedy bargained for by the parties. 
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The judgment appealed from should be reversed and 
the cause remanded with such instructions as to the Court 
may seem proper. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HARRY G. METOS 
RAYS. McCARTY 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON 
and 
FRED H. EVANS 
Attorneys for Plaimtiff s and Appella;n.ts 
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